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Abstract Economics can benefit through adopting various ideas from social
psychology. Social and economic processes can be analysed at different lev-
els: the microlevel (individuals), mesolevel (system structures), and macrolevel
(whole socioeconomic system). Contrary to classic economic models, when making
decisions, people do not consider all available information at the microlevel—
this is not possible. Decisions may have many competing dimensions and there
may be no single optimum. Whereas in traditional economy the main difference
between the levels is the degree of aggregation, social constructionism studies how
individuals cooperatively create, change and maintain their understanding of the
world. Meanings arise as a result of coordinated action of humans who interpret
their world by building models of it and how it functions. A natural way of acquiring
meanings and conveying them to others is through narratives—stories that have a
beginning, a body, and an end. Narratives exist at all levels of social reality. They
provide the structure by which an individual can understand the world, with their
roles in narratives individuals suggesting how to behave. Interacting individuals
socially construct narratives bottom-up. Group narratives emerge from integration
of stories describing individual experiences of actors. Shared narratives allow actors
to find commonality in their experiences, find coherence in the flow of events and
allow them to coordinate in common actions. At the macrolevel narratives define
the system and its common culture. Sometimes narration may have more impact on
an economy than hard data. Even the choice of which facts we refer to and those
we do not may determine the leading narrative and hence the behaviour of people.
Socio-economic processes can and should be analysed in line with narratives linking
individuals, organisations and societies to better understand what is happening in the
whole economic system.
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1 Introduction
In the traditional approach to economy models of rational choice describe individual
decisions, where it is assumed that each individual makes decisions independently
of the others, maximising his or her utility. It is also assumed that choices
of individuals can be summed at higher levels of aggregation, with the laws
operating on the group and societal levels being directly derived from the rules
that govern individual behaviour. A further assumption, that economic systems
are at equilibrium, underlies the formal orthodox descriptions of the properties of
economic systems.
Recent empirical research has challenged the theoretical assumptions of classical
economic theory, while the inability of these theories to predict the economic crisis
of 2008 has called into question the practical utility of equilibrium-based economic
theories. Although useful as a ‘thinking tool’, traditional models of economy need
to be open to knowledge derived from other scientific disciplines.
In this chapter we will focus on how economics can benefit through adopting
various ideas from social psychology. We will explore the view that economic
processes are in fact emergent social phenomena where the dynamics of group
processes drive market dynamics [1]. We will argue that because most social
phenomena cannot be well described by the concept of equilibrium we need to go
beyond the concept of equilibrium to understand market dynamics. We will pay
special attention to the constructivist view [5], which states that social reality is
constructed and maintained in the interactions among individuals. We will consider
how social and economic reality, especially its symbolic level, is constructed by
narratives [13].
We argue that economy is driven to a large part by psychological and social
dynamics and examine the mechanisms by which processes operating at the level
of individual and social group affect economic processes. First we will discuss
different levels of the system showing how social phenomena interplay between
micro-, meso- and macro-levels, then we will describe the new agent whose
behaviour is far more complex than traditional economy assumes, and finally we
will elaborate on the notion of narrations and how they may influence economic
systems.
2 Levels of the System
It is clear that social and economic processes can be analysed at different levels:
microlevel corresponding to individuals, mesolevel representing the structures of
the system, and the macrolevel being the whole socioeconomic system [10, 11].
In traditional economy it is assumed that the main difference between the levels
is in the degree of aggregation. Phenomena at mesolevel represent the summation
of individual processes, and the macro-level phenomena represent aggregation of
phenomena happening at the lower levels. According to this view the same rules
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operate at each level, and the levels differ mainly in the degree of aggregation.
For example, individuals maximise utility in their decision-making, social groups
maximise utility as the sum of the individual utilities, and this sums to the
optimisation of the utility at the system level.
In reality, however, processes occurring at each of the levels are very different.
For example, individuals’ attempts to maximise the utility of their decisions at the
microlevel can result in groups reaching poor outcomes at the mesolevel when the
interdependence between individual decisions resembles the prisoner’s dilemma
[45]. Processes occurring at different levels are different from each other and are
governed by different laws. Processes at different levels can interact with each other,
and there is constant feedback between all levels [43] due to processes at one level
influencing and modifying processes at other levels.
The levels of social reality differ not only structurally, but also in terms of
content, and types of processes that occur at each level. At the individual level
individuals are represented as agents. They take decisions, but also they experience
emotions, remember events, have opinions and attitudes, have multiple values
and goals, perform actions, and are subject to social norms. In fact, a variety
of psychological processes occur at the individual level. Knowing the unrealistic
assumptions of the rational choice model, [25] proposed their famous prospect
theory where the description of the decision making process takes into account
psychological factors such as risk aversion, e.g. people gain and lose weight
differently (Pratt, 1964). Social psychology gives also evidence that people often
make choices based on emotions and not cold calculation [9, 63].
3 The Myth of Rational Decision Making at the Microlevel
Contrary to classic economic models, when making decisions, people do not
consider all available information, but are subject to cognitive closure [28]. Even
if at first individuals are open to new information, when they make a decision this
openness disappears and is replaced by selective searching only for information
to support their decision, with any contradictory information being dismissed.
Research also shows that people are vulnerable to psychological biases affecting
their assessment of situations and influencing their economic behaviour. Broadly
described in the literature (e.g. [15, 26, 61]) are following the biases:
• anchoring—when making decisions, people tend to rely too heavily on one piece
of information, even if it is not the most relevant
• framing—people make different choices depending on how a dilemma is pre-
sented to them
• wishful thinking—people have an unrealistically positive view of their situation
and abilities
• self-attribution—people tend to take credit for successful events, while blaming
external factors such as ‘bad luck’ for any shortcomings or failures
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to name but a few. Research in social psychology has shown that people do not act
according to the rational choice model, but rather base their decisions on schema
(e.g. [3, 48]).
For example, children working as street vendors in Brazil, who can ably calculate
using money when selling goods on the local street, are unable to repeat the same
arithmetic operations on abstract numbers when asked in a laboratory environment
[7].
In traditional economic thinking humans are perceived as entities trying hard
to maximise their outcomes defined in terms of expected value. However, when
making a decision, people often do not want to maximise their outcomes only in
one dimension, but are interested to reach the maximum outcome in many various
fields. Herbert Simon calls this satisficing where outcomes on qualitatively different
dimensions have to be traded off against each other [51]. For example, when buying
car individuals may want a convenient and reliable means of transport at the lowest
possible cost while trying to win popularity among their friends or attract new
partners by having a car at the highest possible cost. Buying an inexpensive car
is irrational on the popularity dimension while buying an expensive car is irrational
on the transport dimension. A compromise of buying a medium price car could
be irrational on both dimensions. Hence decisions that seem irrational from the
perspective of one goal may turn out to be very rational if only we take other goals
into account.
Furthermore, many times people do not make any decisions at all, but simply
copy decisions of others, making the dynamics at the microlevel even more difficult
to capture [4].
All the above processes take place at microlevel [27], with consequences that
shape the whole system at higher levels. Realistic representation of the agents is the
basis for understanding how social economic systems work. Agents are connected
by social relations to other agents, and they belong to groups and organisations. This
gives rise to structures at the mesolevel.
4 The Mesolevel
From the perspective of Non-Equilibrium Social Science (NESS), the mesolevel
is the most interesting, since it determines the relationship between micro and
macro. The mesolevel is blurry, changing and heterogeneous. In fact, it is an
agglomerate of various kinds of very different structures. It is composed, first of
all, of formal structures like firms, organisations, associations, etc. It also contains
informal structures like friendship circles or coalitions. It involves not only stable
social structures, but also intermittent ones, which exist only for a short time
such as meetings and gatherings, temporary alliances, etc. The mesolevel can be
characterised not only by the social structures it contains, but also by different
types of content and processes that exist at this level. Social groups have identities,
and these identities have strong influence on how they behave [53]. Social groups
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converge on their view of reality, and their shared reality is the platform for group
action. Most typically, reality is understood in terms of narratives [41]. Narratives
are constructed, circulated and evolve in social groups [17]. They decide not only
how groups understand reality, but also which decisions groups make and which
courses of action groups take [58].
5 The Macrolevel
Although the macro level, the level of the whole system, can be described in
terms of its own rules, from the perspective of NESS, it is most revealing to
analyse the macro-level in terms of the dynamics produced by the interaction of
the entities present at lower levels of the system. The macrolevel is never exactly
at the equilibrium [43]. It may oscillate around an equilibrium or fixed-point
attractor, but sometimes it may jump abruptly between different attractors of the
social system [8]. Moreover, the equilibria or attractors are not static but change in
time. Instead of trying to characterise a system in terms of its stable equilibrium,
the perspective of NESS suggests viewing the system at different timescales. For
example individual sentiments may change on a fast time scale, while the system’s
attractors may change on a longer time scale. From this perspective the rules
governing the system may not be stable. They result from the processes operating
at the mesolevel, which are constantly evolving, and from properties of individuals
which also change in time. Viewing societies and economies as multi-level systems
allows us to go beyond characterizing the current state of the system to understand
the complex dynamics composed of periods of relative stability, but also changes,
which sometime are catastrophic in nature [29, 56].
6 The New Agent
An agent is connected, not isolated. An agent is connected by multidimensional
links to other agents and many mesolevel structures. Relations of passing infor-
mation, social influence and social interdependence connect an agent to his or
her social context [57]. An agent often relies on others for getting information.
Also individuals influence each other with respect to making opinions forming
attitudes, etc. Although agents sometimes take decisions by processing information,
comparing alternative courses of action and maximising expected outcomes, often
they simply copy the decisions of others to whom they are connected by social
relationships [4]. This is especially true in our complex modern world, where for
most economic decisions the number of alternatives is far too high to evaluate them
all. Often the nature of an agent’s purchasing decision is that of whose choice to
follow, rather than deciding which product best satisfies their needs. Social laws may
thus better explain economic decisions, than cognitive rules. By copying, choices of
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some individuals get multiplied which can result in cascades of adoption. Agent’s
choices change the payoff structure of other agents. This forms interdependence
relations. Game theory focuses on analyzing social interdependence and decisions
of dyads or groups of agents interconnected by interdependence relationships
[30, 42]. The most famous type of interdependence is the prisoners’ dilemma [45],
but many other types of links have been investigated in the context of structures of
interdependent decision makers [60].
Agents are heterogeneous in many aspects. They differ in their knowledge,
position in social networks, values they try to maximise, social orientation (e.g
how cooperative or competitive they are), personality traits, etc. It is especially
interesting how the dynamics of social and economic processes differ with respect
to power, impact and narratives.
The behaviour of an agent is largely guided by the narratives they have adopted
or created [58]. Agents strive for coherence with others to whom they are connected
by relations, or with the mesolevel structures they are connected to [49]. Through
mutual influences, agents form a shared reality that provides a mutually agreed upon
social representation and evaluation of the world they live in. Since individuals tend
to represent themselves and their surrounding world in the form of narrations, social
representation usually takes the form of shared narratives.
Agents and their relationships change in time where some changes are due to
the developmental process of maturation and ageing, but the changes are mainly the
result of events and interactions [12]. Agents learn. Agent’s past experiences and
their own decisions influence their current decisions and behaviours. They acquire
new information. They form new opinions, attitudes and identities [41]. Although
maximisation in most theoretical approaches is the main principle that guides agent
decision making, a crucial question is ‘what does an agent maximise?’ What are
the goals and values of an agent? In most situations agents have multiple goals and
different values guide their actions. Goals go far beyond monetary outcomes, are
likely to involve social motives such as winning in competition, achieving higher
status, strengthening friendship, or may be guided by empathy. Some values cannot
be related to each other, e.g. what is the price of the life of one’s child. Multiple
goals, values and motives form multidimensional configurations. What influences
individuals is not only the summary utility of all the goals that a choice will satisfy,
but also the configuration of the ensemble. For example, individuals are more likely
to choose courses of action that will satisfice all their goals, although other choices
may lead to higher summed utility. Individuals also may avoid alternatives that lead
to violation of important values or norms. There are reasons to believe that decisions
are made not only on the basis of their outcomes, but also properties of the decision
process. For example individuals may prefer choices made by a simpler or more
coherent process, such as one that requires less cognitive effort, or one that avoids
having to deal with conflicting values.
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7 Narratives
Social constructionism studies how individuals cooperatively create, change and
maintain their understanding of their world, and common knowledge of their
reality [5, 16]. According to this theory meanings arise as a result of coordinated
action of humans who interpret their world by building models of it and how it
functions. Berger and Luckmann [5] state that any social order is an ‘ongoing human
production’. The main medium in this process of reality construction, negotiation
and transmission is language [13]. Knowledge of reality is not inherent and given to
people, but comes from and is reinforced by social interactions [19, 40, 46, 50, 59].
In order to persevere it has to be continuously reaffirmed.
Narratives are stories that have a beginning, a body, and an end. They have a plot.
They describe temporal sequences of actions performed by agents and events and
their consequences. Agents have roles, they try to achieve goals, have intentions and
plans. They are connected by relations to other agents. Narratives may be simple or
multithreaded, i.e. composed of interrelated simpler narrations.
Agents differ with respect to their relationship to narratives. Agents adopt
narratives. Agents share narratives with other individuals in the social structure they
belong to [5]. They attach their personal narratives to the narratives of the groups
they belong to. They also change existing narratives and create new ones, usually in
interactions with others, in a social process.
Narratives provide the structure by which individuals understand the world, in
which they live. They tell individuals which elements and processes are related to
each other, how to structure their experience, how to evaluate the other individuals,
objects and processes. By knowing their roles in narratives individuals know how
to behave [5]. Narratives also tell individuals how others are likely to behave.
Narratives lead to actions and they are thus causally linked to behaviours.
Narratives exist at all the levels of social reality: micro, meso and macro. At the
individual level they are an essential element of self-structure, telling an agent what
is his or her identity, what are his or her relations and obligations to others, what are
the expected actions of others, what is the meaning of an object action or event, and
what actions should be performed [34, 44, 52]. They also inform the achievement
of goals and the consequences of actions.
Narratives developed by individuals about themselves, where author of a narra-
tive is also the foreground hero of it, are called auto-narratives [58]. Auto-narrative
schemas determine the behaviour of individuals’ social as well as economic actions,
and influence the contents of narrative identity [33, 44, 52]. Special types of auto-
narratives are simulations of the future, rich in scenarios for possible and desirable
events. They can positively impact on the direction of attention and thinking,
selectivity of the memory and subjective probability of implementation of plans
[61]. These effects can increase an individuals’ engagement in the realisation of a
plan.
The ‘meaning of life’ created by narratives helps individuals better understand
the mechanisms underlying their actions, thereby causing a greater sense of control
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over the environment and their own life [54]. Actions are more organised and more
effective [55]. This results in building willpower and maintaining goals and plans,
even in difficult circumstances. It also helps implement long-term plans [20].
At the mesolevel the main role of narratives is the integration of elements into
wholes capable of coherent action. They play a key role for building mesolevel
structures and are platforms for coordination of collective actions [47]. Narratives
are the primary tools for building collective identities [19, 23, 39]. Who are we?
What are our values and goals? What are our norms? How do we act? How do
we relate to each other? Who are our friends? Who are our enemies? What is our
history? What is our future? What other objects are important to us? Narratives
typically answer these questions. Narratives represent the main element of content
existing at the mesolevel. They construct mesolevel entities. We are together,
although we may be different, because we belong to the same story. Narratives
define the culture of organisations.
Narratives also link events in networks. Successive events may be seen as
related or unrelated, depending on the narrative in which they become embedded.
Narratives also define which actions and events are connected by causal links, and
thus provide a structure for prediction and goal achievement.
Narratives can also be created on purpose and transmitted in a top-down
process by high-status actors with power and authority, as for example the mission
statements of a company, or its official history. These represent the official narratives
of an organisation. They serve the purpose of controlling the dynamics of the
organisation and impose interpretations of the organisation both within and outside
of the organisation.
Interacting individuals also socially construct narratives in a bottom-up pro-
cess. Group narratives emerge from integration of stories describing individual
experiences of actors. Shared narratives allow actors to find commonality in their
experiences, find coherence in the flow of events and allow them to coordinate in
common actions. Unofficial narratives are built in relation to the official narratives.
They are either built in agreement with the official narratives, serving as their
instantiations, or they are built in opposition to the official ones, rebelling against
them.
At the macrolevel narratives define the system and its common culture. Lack of
an adequate narrative for Europe is cited as one of the causes of its current weakness,
and a cause of problems with EU integration [2]. Creating the common narrative for
Portugal, in a poem ‘Os Lusíadas’, by Luis de Camoe has been seen as one of the
main causes for the rise of Portugal as a nation separate from Spain. In Poland, the
poetic narrations of the romantic poets Mickiewicz, Slowacki and Norwid are seen
as one of the reasons why Poland was recreated by the efforts of its citizens after
more than a 100 years of non-existence [22, 62].
Narratives have different sources. Each culture is built around some common
narrative schema such as fairy tales, themes of books and movies, or passed
across generations as family histories [18]. These narrative schemas provide the
basic plot to specific narrations, inter alia, concerning work, economic injustice,
wealth etc. In the USA, for example, the most common narrative story is ‘an
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actor achieved his or her goals despite great obstacles’ [33]. This narrative schema
shapes personal stories, is embodied in the plots of books and movies which in
addition to telling a specific story also strengthen the narrative schema. It also
influences behaviour, telling the actors that difficulties are to be expected, that
they can be overcome by persistence, and that the goals can be achieved. Another
US narrative schema is redemption [31–33, 35–38]. In this schema an actor, who
initially has negative characteristics, is radically transformed by a person or an
experience and achieves very positive characteristics. Robinson Crusoe and some
of the novels by Jack London conveyed a narrative of early capitalism, showing
how the actor becomes progressively richer by sustained hard work. Depending on
which narratives dominate (be they secular or religious) in the given community, we
can expect people to act according to them.
Narratives also emerge from shared experiences [6]. This is the bottom-up route
to the formation of narratives. Actors share stories and relate them to each other.
Similar stories merge into shared narrations providing a shared interpretation of
common experiences. In this process, individuals may internalise experiences that
never occurred to them and treat them as their own. Also, choices of individuals
based on random factors (such as an exposure to a product) may become included in
personal and subsequently group narratives and start to shape decisions and actions.
Narrative schemas, though their repetitions in narratives, provide a common
ground for values and norms of a culture [17]. They also become schemas for the
construction of personal narrations, which structure the experience of individuals.
Adopting a narrative is quite different from learning about a narrative. In contrast
to narratives that individuals ‘just know about’, adopted narratives guide emotional
reactions, reasoning, and action. There are different levels of adopting a narrative.
At the first level narratives become accepted or rejected. Deciding that a narrative
describes reality moves it to a deeper level of acceptance. At a very deep level of
adoption a narrative becomes included in a person’s self-structure. It becomes a
part of their personal identity, is used to structure and give meaning to personal
experience and guides their decisions and actions [52]. The role an individual has,
thanks to narrative, become a source of their identity and they enact this role in what
they do.
Some narratives are easier to evolve and adopt than others. How easy it is to adopt
a narrative depends both on the features of the narrative, on the social context in
which it is passed and on the relations of the narrative to the culture of the narrative
group, mostly the already existing narratives [14, 24]. Narratives that contain tension
are more interesting and easier to pass on than boring narratives. Narratives that
adhere to exiting narrative schema are better remembered and more easily accepted.
Narratives emerging from bigger narrative communities are easier to adopt and
evolve.
Narrative power, the power to edit and control narratives, is an important source
of control in social processes. There are several mechanisms determining narrative
power. Authority is an obvious source of narrative power [21]. Both societies and
organisations have rules assigning power to modify narrations. In the extreme
version it may involve a right to censor the narrations of others. Authority also
54 A. Nowak et al.
gives means for propagating narratives such as the control of the media or official
communication channels. Reputation, often based on the history of producing
successful narratives, is also an important source of narrative power.
The rise of the Internet and especially social media have to some degree
decoupled narrative power from traditional authority. Companies, for example, feel
that Internet reputation and recommendation systems dramatically decreased their
power to control the narratives concerning their companies and products. In a similar
vein, politicians in totalitarian countries are discovering that they have lost their
monopoly for constructing shared narrations. The events of the Arab Spring clearly
show how the loss of the monopoly for constructing shared narrations, which in this
case was caused by social media, can led to coordinated social action against the
authorities.
Narrative power is related to the access to both official and unofficial commu-
nication channels, e.g. large personal networks, or high number Twitter followers.
It is also related to credibility and trust. A related characteristic is the power to
edit narratives. The capacity to capture attention is a major factor in the ability to
create a popular narrative. The power to edit and change narratives is more related
to credibility and trust. It is also the case that narratives define who has the power
to edit narratives. Narratives establish reputation and credibility, such as to say who
has the best judgment, who has firsthand knowledge, who is honest, etc. The power
to edit narratives is critical for preventing damage to reputation caused by narratives.
One of the main questions for understanding social dynamics is how information
is transformed into knowledge. Information by itself does not lead to action. For
action, information needs to be transformed into knowledge. Narratives play a
critical role in transforming information into knowledge by structuring it, placing
it in context and linking it to prediction. For example, the Polish economy is one
of the healthiest in Europe. It is the only economy in Europe that did not join
the recent recession. Yet, most of the Polish population feel their economy is in
a state of catastrophe and periodically there are massive demonstrations demanding
the recall of the government and impeachment of the prime minister. Here the
Polish opposition has succeeded in generating a narrative of failure [62]. In contrast,
the case of Ireland provides a different story. Until the catastrophic crisis of 2008
economists and politicians in Europe believed that the Irish economy was sound, just
because Ireland was Northern and Germanic. As another example, the government
debt rates of Spain, Germany and Great Britain are very similar. However, the
interest on these debts are vastly different, much lower in the case of Great Britain
and Germany than in Spain. Clearly, opposite narratives can be built on the same
information.
This raises two distinct sets of questions. The first is related to narratives. What
is the relation between narratives and information? Under which circumstances and
to what extent does information restrain building narratives? How does information
facilitate, or hinder the propagation of narratives? The second set of questions is
related to how to extract knowledge from information. It is based on the assumption
that knowledge provides a basis for decision-making. How can information be
transformed into knowledge? How can that knowledge be propagated? How can we
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create knowledge? The capacity to turn information into useful, unbiased knowledge
is one of the principal factors deciding the success of firms.
As we can see, sometimes narration may have more impact on an economy
than hard data. Even the choice of which facts we refer to and those we do not
may determine the leading narrative and hence the behaviour of people. In physical
systems there is no meaning. In economics, we cannot afford the comfort of relying
only on calculus as what is happening in the economy is happening in the world
of meanings. Here the equilibrium models showing supply-demand balance are
of no help (unless they are analysed as possible narratives). From the perspective
of the NESS, socio-economic processes can and should be analysed in line with
narratives linking individuals, organisations and societies to better understand what
is happening in the whole economic system.
8 Conclusions
In conclusion, not only do social processes govern the dynamics of economic
processes. They also determine a constructed social and economic reality, which is
maintained and changed by the process of constructing shared reality. The dynamics
of narrative play a major role in this. Social processes are not driven by equilibrium
dynamics, and it follows that economic processes in a large part are non-equilibrium.
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